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We address whether cooperative behavior in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is
more easily achieved under ‘‘good circumstances’’ (all payoffs in the constituent PD
are positive), ‘‘bad circumstances’’ (payoffs are negative), or ‘‘mixed circum-
stances.’’ To analyze the behavior in these repeated PDs, we developed and applied
a learning model that improves upon standard learning models in two ways: (1) It
allows for statistical tests of the parameter estimates, and (2) it allows for the
incorporation of independent variables (e.g., subject or game characteristics).
The model is applied to the data of the repeated PD experiment in van Assen
and Snijders (2004, 2005). Our findings demonstrate that our model can be used
to identify and test how learning differs across persons and across different
circumstances.
Keywords: prisoner’s dilemma, collective action, learning, learning models, risk, risk
preferences
INTRODUCTION
We focus on actors’ behavior in (repeated) prisoners’ dilemmas that
are similar except for a shift in their outcomes. More specifically,
the research question investigated in the present paper is whether
actors differ in their inclination to cooperate in ‘‘negative,’’ ‘‘mixed,’’
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and ‘‘positive’’ prisoners’ dilemmas. Negative prisoners’ dilemmas
have only negative outcomes in the constituent game, positive dilem-
mas have only positive outcomes, while the best outcomes in mixed
dilemmas are positive and the worst are negative. In order to answer
this research question a new methodology, a statistical learning
model, is developed in the present paper. After describing the model
and its advantages compared with traditional methodology, the
research question is answered by applying the model to an existing
data set.
The question whether actors are more prone to cooperation in nega-
tive social dilemmas than in positive social dilemmas has been ana-
lyzed by several social scientists working in the domain of collective
action (Berejikian, 1992; Walder, 1994). Walder (1994, p.9), for
instance, argued, ‘‘that loss is a more powerful motivator than gain,
or that groups threatened with a loss will be more likely to protest
than groups that seek proactively to achieve a gain,’’ where protesting
corresponds to cooperating. He derives this hypothesis from historical
evidence and from the empirical regularity in individual decision
making that actors in general are risk seeking in situations where
outcomes are losses, and risk averse in situation where outcomes are
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Berejikian (1992) arrives at a
similar conclusion.
Raub and Snijders (1997; Snijders and Raub, 1998) also analyzed
the issue of cooperation, but in the context of indefinitely repeated
two-person prisoners’ dilemmas (PDs). They applied a game-theoretic
analysis and came to opposite implications, of which we briefly recap-
itulate the main argument here. A repeated (two-person) PD is a PD
game that is played repetitively in subsequent periods by the same
two actors. The PD is indefinite when there is a certain fixed prob-
ability larger than zero and smaller than one that another period of
the PD will be played by these two actors. Raub and Snijders claimed
that these repeated PDs approximate a relevant set of collective action
problems and social dilemma situations. They showed that a game-
theoretic analysis of such repeated PDs results in the prediction that
risk-averse individuals are more inclined to cooperate than risk-
seeking individuals. Assuming that most individuals are risk seeking
for losses and risk averse for gains, Raub and Snijders predicted larger
cooperation levels in positive social dilemmas than in negative social
dilemmas. They tested their hypothesis empirically in an experiment.
The proportion of individuals that cooperated in the first period did
not differ significantly between positive and negative dilemmas, but
they did find that risk aversion promoted cooperation. Hence their
results were in agreement with their prediction and falsified the

































hypothesis of Walder and Berejikian. In subsequent studies the game-
theoretic analysis was also applied to mixed social dilemmas (van
Assen, 1998; van Assen and Snijders, 2004, 2005). Van Assen showed
that loss aversion, that is, the phenomenon that losses loom larger
than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), promotes cooperation in
mixed social dilemmas. Because experiments on individual decision
making demonstrate that individuals are loss averse, he predicted
that actors are even more inclined to cooperate in mixed dilemmas
than in positive and negative dilemmas. Van Assen and Snijders
(2004, 2005) tested this hypothesis in an experiment that involved four
repeated PDs that were similar except for a shift in their outcomes.
The proportion of individuals that cooperated in the first period did
not differ significantly between negative, mixed, and positive dilem-
mas. However, there was some evidence in favor of the hypotheses
that risk aversion and loss aversion promote cooperation.
In the present study, cooperation in negative, mixed, and positive
PDs is investigated by reanalyzing the data of the experiment of van
Assen and Snijders using a new methodology, a statistical learning
model. The model developed and described in this paper has three
advantages over other more traditional methods that have been used
to analyze data of repeated games. Advantages are that the model
allows for:
(1) an analysis that takes known empirical falsifications of standard
game theoretic models into account and allows for other kinds of
learning,
(2) a stronger test of the role of risk preferences in repeated PDs,
(3) a more efficient use of the available data—from about 10% to close
to 100%, and
(4) can be generalized beyond the repeated PD case.
These advantages are explained subsequently.
With respect to the first advantage we start by noting that the stan-
dard game-theoretic analysis could only be applied straightforwardly
to predict actors’ behavior in the first period of the PD. The reason
is that the standard game-theoretic analyses assume that actors are
strictly forward-looking. In an analysis of repeated PDs with complete
information, this implies that the behavior in the previous period
should not matter, but we know from the empirical data that it does.
One obvious improvement would therefore be to somehow involve
what happened in previous periods in the decisions of actors in sub-
sequent periods. This is in line with a well-known result in the empiri-
cal analyses of repeated PDs: a large number of variables affect

































cooperation that according to the standard game-theoretic model
should not (e.g., Cain, 1998; Sally, 1995).
The observation that people not only predict but also adapt led some
scientists to model actors’ behavior in repeated PDs with learning
models based on simple psychological assumptions on how actors
choose their behavior depending on reinforcements and punishments
they have received in the history of the game. In the literature on
learning, ‘learning’ is in general not interpreted as ‘discovering how
to play to obtain better outcomes’ but simply as ‘a change in behavior’.
Studies modeling behavioral dynamics in repeated games with learn-
ing models have powerfully made the case that learning models have
potential for describing these dynamics (see, e.g., Chapter 6 of
Camerer, 2003, and Erev and Roth, 1998, for an overview), but much
remains to be desired in these models. We believe that an analysis of
the data of our experiment with a learning model might also detect
and explain differences in behavioral dynamics in social dilemmas
differing in their range of outcomes.
Second, learning models should allow for the possibility that not
only characteristics of the subjects, such as risk preferences, matter
for the probability to cooperate in a repeated PD but also the ‘‘history
of the game’’ (cf. Gautschi, 2002) matters as well. In this sense, being
able to include data on behavior in later periods provides a stronger
test of the hypotheses on risk preferences. It would provide strong sup-
port for the hypotheses on risk preferences if its effects surface even in
later periods where the history of the game can be expected to have an
important effect on behavior.
Third, another reason to employ a learning model is that traditional
data analysis methods cannot handle the dependencies that exist
between the responses of the actors in period 2 and beyond of the
repeated PD, and between subsequently played games. That is, the
probability to cooperate in a game likely depends on the history of
the game and the history of playing other games. The number of poss-
ible histories grows exponentially with the number of periods that the
game is played, making it impossible to devise statistical tests at a
reasonable level of power. Therefore, both Raub and Snijders (1997)
and van Assen and Snijders (2004, 2005) discarded all responses in
period 2 and beyond of each repeated PD. They also discarded all data
obtained from games played after the first games, precisely because of
possible learning effects that might have occurred between games. As
a result, the vast majority of the data remained unused; van Assen and
Snijders (2004, 2005) even discarded more than 90% of their data
because of possible learning effects intervening with effects of risk pre-
ferences. If a learning model is employed, then in principle all data can

































be considered in the analysis because its basic assumption is that an
actor’s choice is dependent on the history of choices of himself and
the other actor.
To summarize, in the present study we attempt to answer the
research question whether the behavioral dynamics are different for
negative, mixed, and positive repeated PDs by employing a new learn-
ing model, the logistic learning model. The next two sections are
devoted to learning models as a method to answer our research ques-
tion. In the next section a brief sketch is provided of previous research
employing learning models, and our model is situated in this line of
research. Our model is explained in detail in the section Logistic
Learning Model. That section also summarizes the hypotheses that
we tested using our model. The experiment of van Assen and Snijders
to which the model is applied is described in brief in the Experiment
section. The Results section summarizes the results of applying the
learning model to the data of the experiment to answer our research
question. Finally, we present a conclusion and discussion, which con-
tains an inventory of advantages of using the logistic learning model
as a general tool to model behavior in any repeated game, not just
the PD.
LEARNING MODELS OF BEHAVIOR
A number of different learning models have been described in the
literature. The two most well-known models are the Bush-Mosteller
learning model (1951, 1955) and the Roth-Erev learning model
(1995; Erev and Roth, 1998, 1999). Both models are so-called reinforce-
ment models of learning. Reinforcement models assume that the out-
come of an actor’s decision is ‘reinforced’ on the basis of the payoff an
actor receives. There are many more approaches to learning in games
in general and social dilemmas in particular, including evolutionary
dynamics, belief learning, sophisticated anticipatory learning,
experience-weighted attraction learning, imitation, direction learning,
and rule learning. In the past five years or so, the number of articles
focusing on learning in games using one or more of these approaches
has increased dramatically. We refer the reader to Chapter 6 of
Camerer’s (2003) recent book on behavioral game theory for an
overview of the field.
In fact, none of the models described in the literature on learning in
games qualifies for our purposes. One problem of the existing models
is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between most of the para-
meters in the model and the payoffs of the game. For example, the tra-
ditional Bush-Mosteller and Roth-Erev reinforcement models assume

































that an action’s reinforcement is equal to the payoff it yields (Erev
and Roth, 1998, 1999; Flache and Macy, 2002; Roth and Erev, 1995).
Because the payoff structure is identical for the PDs used in our study,
the traditional models would yield identical predictions in these PDs.
Given that we precisely want to test whether behavior and learning is
identical in these PDs, these traditional models are not adequate.
A second problem is that the models described in the literature do
not allow for statistical tests of effects of independent variables. That
is, in the present study we focus on testing whether the outcome
domain (losses, gains, mixed) affects the behavioral dynamics of the
repeated PD game. We want to be able to control for characteristics
of the subject, the game, and the history of play. Existing models are
not adequate because they do not allow incorporation of such vari-
ables. We developed a logistic learning model where the incorporation
of such variables is possible, and therefore argue that this statistical
model presents a major step forward in modeling behavior in repeated
games. This model is described in the next section.
THE LOGISTIC LEARNING MODEL
The logistic learning model can be applied to any game with two alter-
natives for all the players involved in the game, but in this case we
only need to focus on the two-person PD. Denoting one of the two
choices of actor j in period t of the game by Yjt ¼ 1 and the other choice
by Yjt ¼ 0, it is assumed that the probability of Yjt ¼ 1 is a logistic func-
tion of Xjt:
PðYjt ¼ 1Þ ¼ e
Xjt
1þ eXjt ð1Þ
Cooperation is here arbitrarily designated by ‘1’ and defection by ‘0’.
Hence our learning model represents a logistic regression of
cooperation on Xji. Xjt can be regarded as j’s propensity to play
Yjt ¼ 1, and is itself also a function. Function Xjt, called the logit in
logistic regression, for a two-person game with two alternatives for
each player is given by:
Xjt ¼ b0 þ
Xt1
r¼1
atr1ðb00 þ b10Yjr þ b01Ykr þ b11YjrYkrÞ ð2Þ
There are two important differences between our model and models
estimated in traditional logistic regression analysis. The first differ-
ence is the specific structure of the logit Xjt in our model. The second
difference is that we allow for independent variables entering the

































model by assuming that the coefficients may depend on them, as we
explain below.
In ‘normal’ logistic regression, the logit is a function of the inde-
pendent variables. In contrast, the logit in our model is a function of
behavior in previous periods and has a specific structure containing
three elements. The first element is the constant b0. This constant
reflects the initial propensity to play 1 in the first period, or Yjl ¼ 1.
Other reinforcement learning models, such as the Bush-Mosteller
and Roth-Erev models also contain a parameter corresponding to the
initial propensities to choose one of the two behavioral alternatives.
However, contrary to these two models, in our model this initial pro-
pensity is not discounted. That is, the effect of the initial propensity
on the total propensity to cooperate is constant across all periods.
We chose not to discount b0 to reflect the belief from personality psy-
chology that persons are endowed with relatively stable personality
traits that are not affected by a few rounds of game playing.
The second element in Xjt is a linear term b00 þ b10Yjr þ b01Ykrþ
b11YjrYkr. This linear combination contains four parameters, one para-
meter for each cell in the two-by-two game. Depending on the choices
of actors j and k in period r, a possibly different reinforcement or value
is added to Xjrþ1. Table 1 shows the value added to Xjrþ1 for each com-
bination of choices.
Note that b00 represents the effect of both actors playing 0 in period
r, while b01 and b10 represents the effects of only one actor playing 1.
Parameter b11 can be considered as the (interaction) effect of both
actors playing 1 that cannot be explained by simple addition of the
effects b10 and b01. The Bush-Mosteller and Roth-Erev models also
incorporate parameters corresponding to all choice combinations.
Finally, the third element of the function Xjt is the geometrical dis-
counting of the history of play in the game, represented by the sum
involving a discount factor a. If a ¼ 0, then only choices in the last per-
iod have an effect on Xjt. If a ¼ 1, then a particular choice combination
in period r exerts its effect in all future periods in the same way; that
is, its effect does not diminish over the course of the game. In general,
geometric discounting implies that a particular choice combination in
TABLE 1 The Effect of Both Actors’ Choices (‘0’ ¼ Defection,
‘1’ ¼ Cooperation) in Period r on Xjrþ1
Ykr ¼ 0 Ykr ¼ 1
Yjr ¼ 0 b00 b00 þ b01
Yjr ¼ 1 b00 þ b10 b00 þ b10 þ b10 þ b11

































period r 1 is a times as relevant for the propensity to play 1 than in
period r. It is common to incorporate the history of play in a learning
model by geometrically discounting actors’ choices in the history of the
game. For example, the Bush-Mosteller and Roth-Erev models also
incorporate geometric discounting.
The second difference between traditional logistic regression analy-
sis and our approach is where potential other independent variables
(or control variables) enter the model. In normal logistic regression
the logit is a direct function of the independent variables. In our model
the independent variables, such as an actor’s risk aversion, the payoffs
of each choice combination, or other characteristics, enter Equation (2)
indirectly. The independent variables are used to model the six para-
meters, that is, the values of these parameters are modeled as a linear
combination of the variables hypothesized by the researcher to be rel-
evant for the effect of the choice combination corresponding to the
parameter. These variables can be distinguished into subject charac-
teristics, game characteristics, history of play characteristics, and
interactions between them. Note that the model allows that such vari-
ables can enter the equation more than once because one can model an
effect of a variable on any of the different parameters.
Subject characteristics are variables such as sex, ethnicity, age,
education, but also include variables such as risk aversion, social
orientation, and intelligence. The game characteristics are variables
involving features of the game, such as the payoffs, information of
the game provided to the subjects, communication possibilities, and
content of the instruction. History of play characteristics are variables
related to the course of play in the experiment, e.g., the number of
times a game is played and the period of the game.
We now apply the logistic learning model to test a number of
hypotheses concerning our research question and the effects of several
subject, game, and history of play characteristics that can be relevant
for cooperation in the PD (Sally, 1995; Cain, 1999). The statistical or
null hypotheses tested are that the value of each of the six parameters
is not affected by the game characteristic PD type (negative, mixed,
positive), and the subject characteristics gender, number of siblings,
social orientation, risk aversion, and secondary school subjects. We
also test if the history of play characteristics, ‘period’ and ‘game num-
ber’ (the number of times that the repeated PD has been played at the
time or earlier), have an effect. Tests are two-sided because we have no
specific expectations on the direction of a possible effect of the subject
and history of play characteristics.
As far as we know, the logistic learning model cannot be fitted by
logistic regression procedures in standard statistical packages without

































modifications, because the logit in Equation (2) contains a product of
parameters. Explicit programming of the likelihood function is neces-
sary; we used STATA for that purpose. Our implementation allows
estimates of parameters, possibly as a function of several variables
(as in ordinary logistic regression), standard errors of the estimates,
and tests of single parameters, sets of parameters, and complete mod-
els. The standard errors of the estimates are adjusted for the depen-
dencies in the responses not accounted for by the variables
incorporated in the model, using Huber’s clustering approach (Huber,
1967). The log (pseudo-)likelihood value of a model is also reported.
However, because of the dependencies in the responses, the common
likelihood-ratio test cannot be performed. Tests of (sets of) parameters
need to be performed by the Wald test, which are reported in the out-
put of the analyses. The Wald test is comparable to a z-test, and to the




The subjects played four different indefinitely repeated games, all
with a continuation probability equal to 0.5 that a next period is
played in the PD. The outcomes of the games (T, R, P, S) were equal
to T ¼ 20þ D;R ¼ 10þ D;P ¼ 0þ D; and S ¼ 5þ D, with the shift
of outcomes D ¼ 0 (positive PD), D ¼ 5 (mixed PD), D ¼ 10 (mixed
PD), and D ¼ 20 (negative PD).2 The PD and its outcomes is pre-
sented in Table 2.
1See van Assen and Snijders (2004) for details of the experiment.
2The PD with D ¼ 0 and S ¼ 5 was treated as a positive PD because according to
standard game-theoretic predictions only the values of T, R, and P matter, and not
the value of S (Raub and Snijders, 1997; van Assen, 1998).
TABLE 2 The PD in The Experiment with its Out-
comes Dependent on Ego’s (Row) and Alter’s (Column)
Choices (Cooperation, Defection). The First Number in
Each Cell Represents the Outcome of Ego
C D
C 10þ D; 10þ D 5þ D; 20þ D
D 20þ D;5þ D 0þ D;0þ D


































The experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, risk aversion of
subjects was assessed; in the second part, subjects played a number of
repeatedPDs (all behind the computer). The two partswere run ondiffer-
ent days. In total, 216 subjects completed both parts of the experiment.
First Part of the Experiment
Subjects’ risk aversion was assessed in two ways. First, risk aversion
was assessed with a traditional method. The method required subjects
to make three preference comparisons between the gamble
ð20þ D;p;DÞ and certain outcome Rþ D, one for each value of p equal
to 1=3, 1=2, and 2=3. This procedure was repeated for each of the four
values of D. The number of times a subject indicated a preference for
Rþ D over the gamble (either 0, 1, 2, or 3 times) constitutes a measure
of risk aversion for the range of outcomes Pþ D; ½Tþ D.
Subjects’ risk aversion was also assessed with the tradeoff method.
The tradeoff method enabled us to estimate the subjects’ utility para-
metrically; that is, the method generates estimates of concavity of the
utility function and of loss aversion for each subject.
Finally, subjects completed a questionnaire at the end of the first
part. Subjects were asked their age, sex, secondary school subjects,
number of siblings, and whether they had any knowledge of game
theory. The questionnaire was concluded with measurement of the
social orientation of the participant. Subjects received a reward of 35
Dutch guilders (approximately 16 Euros, and at that time approxi-
mately US$ 17.5) for participation.
Second Part of the Experiment
The subjects played the PD not against another player in the lab but
against a computer program. There are many complementary advan-
tages of having subjects playing against a program instead of human
subjects (see van Assen and Snijders, 2004, for a discussion). It allows
experimenters to gather a maximum number of possible responses per
subject per time unit, requiring as little time of as few experimenters
as possible, without losing the reality of actual interaction if the
program’s behavior mimics human behavior very well.
The subjects played against the logistic learning model with the








½2:04þ 2:4 yjr þ 2:05 ykr ð3Þ

































The value of Xjt was determined by substituting the history of the PD
game of the subject (3). The probability p that the program cooperated
was obtained by substituting the value of Xjt in (1). The program coop-
erated if the value of a draw from the uniform probability distribution
was in the interval [0, p], and defected if it was in the interval [p, 1].
This specification of the learning model and its values of the para-
meters was obtained by fitting the logistic learning model to the
responses in repeated PDs in a similar, previous experiment (Raub
and Snijders, 1997). The model fitted the proportion of cooperative
responses in the first five periods in that experiment very well.3 There-
fore, it was as if the subjects in our experiment played against a player
that participated in the experiment of Raub and Snijders (1997). Sub-
jects were told beforehand that they played against a computer pro-
gram mimicking subjects’ behavior in previous experiments, and
that, consequently, it was as if they were playing against a randomly
selected player from a previous experiment, drawn with replacement
before each repeated PD. They were also told that they were not
deceived in any way (which was true). Finally, note that the program’s
strategy is identical in all PD types. This agrees with the null hypoth-
esis to be tested that subjects’ behavior is identical in all PD types.
The subjects played the four different repeated PDs types in a ran-
dom order. The subject continued to play these four repeated PDs in a
random order until 40 minutes had passed, or until (s)he had played
each repeated PD type 20 times.
The subject’s reward in the second part of the experiment was
determined by the random selection method. Their reward was a ran-
dom selection of the outcome of the last period of each of the four dif-
ferent repeated PDs played for the first time, and the outcome of the
last period of an additional PD that was included in the experiment
to increase the subjects’ expected payoff.
RESULTS
The results are presented for different specifications of the logistic
learning model. Figure 1 gives a general idea of what the data look
like. It depicts the proportion of cooperators in the first seven periods
of a game, averaged across all PDs played. Periods eight or higher are
not included in the figure because there are only a small number of
games of this length (approximately 1=27  0:8% of the games have
3The goodness of fit test comparing observed and predicted proportions yielded a
chi-square value of 3.24. This result is not even significant for 1 degree of freedom, even
though many more (dependent) proportions are fitted.

































8 or more periods). The proportion of cooperators varies between 15%
and a little over 30%. Since we are interested in learning effects in the
different constituent games, the graph in itself does not give much
information, other than that the proportions of cooperators in each
period are relatively close for the different games. Note that this does
not say anything about possible effects of personal characteristics on
the probability of cooperation in the repeated PD.
We first present the basic or null model with estimates of the para-
meters a; b0; b00; b01; b10; b11. This model is the benchmark with which
the other models are compared. We then test our main hypothesis that
behavioral dynamics differ between negative, mixed, and positive
repeated PDs. Finally, we briefly present the results of models that
also included history of play and subject characteristics as predictors.
The Basic Model
The parameter estimates and tests whether these estimates equal zero
are shown in Table 3. The log pseudo-likelihood of the model is equal
to 14,449.7. The interpretation of the estimates and their tests in
Table 3 is as in logistic regression. For example, b10 ¼ 1.25 implies
FIGURE 1 Proportion of cooperators per game in the first seven periods for
the positive (D ¼ 0), mixed 1 (D ¼ 5), mixed 2 (D ¼ 10), and negative
(D ¼ 20) PD.

































that unilateral cooperation of ego increases the logit of cooperation
with 1.25, and multiplies the odds to cooperate with e1:25 ¼ 3:49.
The algorithm estimates ln(a), the estimate of a then equals e to the
power ln(a) ¼ 0.3904. That is, on average a particular choice combi-
nation (CC, CD, DC, or DD) in period r 1 is 0.39 times as relevant
for the propensity to cooperate than it is in period r. On average, the
proportion to cooperate in the first period is equal to
0:31 ð¼e0:8177=ð1þ e0:8177ÞÞ. If both actors defected in the last
period, then the odds to cooperate in the following period were
0:393 ð¼e0:9346Þ times as small (p < 0.001). Similarly, if only alter
cooperated, then the odds in the next period were 0.409 times as small.
If only ego cooperated, then the odds to cooperate in the next period
increased, that is, they were 1.365 times as large. These two odds
are not statistically significant, meaning that the effects of mutual
defection and of unilateral cooperation of alter, are similar. Finally,
if both actors cooperated, then the odds of mutual cooperation in the
next period increased dramatically; they were 6.124 times as large.
As expected, the estimates presented in Table 3 reveal that mutual
defection increases defection and mutual cooperation increases
cooperation. Surprisingly, unilateral defection only lowers the
cooperation rate if alter is cooperating and ego is defecting.
Differences Between the PDs
The results of the analysis with respect to our main hypothesis, that
behavior is different in negative, mixed, and positive repeated PDs,
are presented in Table 4. The log pseudo-likelihood of the model, bases
on 26,014 observations, is 13,588.5. The estimate of each parameter
in Eq.(2) can be obtained by substituting the values of the independent
variables in the equation for that parameter. For example, the esti-
mate of b10 for the negative PD is equal to 1.7728  0.8779 ¼ 0.8949.
TABLE 3 Estimates, Based on 27,253 Observations, and Tests of Parameter
Estimates of the Basic Model
Coeff. Robust Std. Err. Z P > jzj
ln(a) 0.9406 .1272 7.39 0.000
b10 1.2458 .1213 10.27 0.000
b01 0.0412 .0895 0.46 0.646
b11 1.4598 .1757 8.31 0.000
b00 0.9346 .0882 10.59 0.000
b0 0.8177 .0945 8.65 0.000

































The results in Table 4 show that there are some clear differences in
behavior in the four PDs. The results of Table 4 can be briefly summar-
ized as follows: the proportion of cooperation in the first period ðb00Þ is
higher in the positive PD than in the negative PD (0.324 versus 0.267,
p ¼ 0.004), and not statistically different from the mixed PDs.
The effects of unilateral cooperation of alter ðb01Þ and of mutual
cooperation ðb11Þ on cooperation are not statistically different for
the four PDs. The shadow of the past was also larger in these two
TABLE 4 Estimates, Based on 26,014 Observations, and Tests of Parameter
Estimates of the Model that includes Type of PD (‘‘POS’’ with D ¼ 0, ‘‘MIX 1’’
with D ¼ 5, ‘‘MIX 2’’ with D ¼ 10, ‘‘NEG’’ with D ¼ 20) as Predictor. ‘‘POS’’
is the Reference Category
Robust
Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > jzj
ln(a)
MIX 1 .1314 .4272 0.31 0.758
MIX 2 .4967 .2235 2.22 0.026
NEG .7094 .2313 3.07 0.002
cons (POS) 1.2729 .2167 5.88 0.000
b10
MIX 1 .3112 .1736 1.79 0.073
MIX 2 .6866 .1676 4.10 0.000
NEG .8779 .1776 4.94 0.000
cons (POS) 1.7728 .1740 10.19 0.000
b01
MIX 1 .2807 .1847 1.52 0.128
MIX 2 .1019 .1949 0.52 0.601
NEG .1504 .1838 0.82 0.413
cons (POS) .0865 .1712 0.51 0.614
b11
MIX 1 .3254 .3090 1.05 0.292
MIX 2 .4193 .3315 1.26 0.206
NEG .5367 .3516 1.53 0.127
cons (POS) 1.7158 .2760 6.22 0.000
b00
MIX 1 .1627 .1245 1.31 0.191
MIX 2 .5154 .1168 4.41 0.000
NEG .7614 .1233 6.17 0.000
cons (POS) 1.3340 .1361 9.80 0.000
b0
MIX 1 .0670 .0453 1.48 0.139
MIX 2 .1171 .0633 1.85 0.064
NEG .2707 .0946 2.86 0.004
cons (POS) .7370 .1124 6.56 0.000

































PDs: 0.46 for the mixed 2 PD ðD ¼ 10Þ and 0.569 for the negative PD,
versus 0.28 for the positive PD and 0.246 for the other mixed PD.
Finally, the effect of mutual defection ðb00Þ on cooperation is larger
(i.e., less negative), and the effect of unilateral cooperation of ego ðb10Þ
on cooperation is smaller (i.e., less positive) for the two PDs with the
largest negative shift ðD ¼ 10 and D ¼ 20Þ of outcomes (p < 0.001).
Other Models
The previous analyses are the ones that are most relevant to our main
hypothesis concerning our research involving the effect of the circum-
stances (bad, mixed, good) on cooperation in social dilemmas. How-
ever, to illustrate the applicability and versatility of the proposed
statistical logistic learning model, in this section the results of analy-
ses that incorporate additional predictors are briefly discussed.
First, an analysis with only risk aversion as assessed with the tra-
ditional method demonstrated that the differences in behavior between
the four PDs cannot be explained by risk aversion if we consider all the
data simultaneously (instead of just the first period). Only a significant
positive effect of risk aversion on mutual defection was observed
(p ¼ 0.002). That is, on average, the more risk averse, the more likely
it is that ego will defect after mutual defection in the previous period.
In addition, we ran three analyses, all based on 25,276 obser-
vations, that include history of play and subject characteristics as
predictors of the parameters a; b0; b00; b01; b10; b11, additional to the
predictors corresponding to game type as in Table 4. Firstly, an analy-
sis was run with game type (MIX 1, MIX 2, Neg), with period (Period),
and with interactions of game type and period (MIX1xPer, MIX2xPer,
NegxPer) as predictors (log pseudo-likelihood ¼13,160.3). With
Period we tested whether the effect of ‘DD’, DC’, ‘CD’, ‘CC’ on
cooperation changed over periods. Secondly, an analysis was run with
game number (Game nr) together with the predictors of the first
analysis (log pseudo-likelihood ¼13,131.5). With game number we
tested whether the initial propensity to cooperate, discounting, and
the effect of ‘DD’, DC’, ‘CD’, ‘CC’ on cooperation changed after playing
more PD games. The first and second analysis only added history of
play variables to the basic model. In the third and final analysis sub-
ject characteristics were included together with all the predictors of
the second analysis (log pseudo-likelihood ¼12,923.5). The subject
characteristics included are gender (Gender), number of siblings
(Siblings), number of science subjects in secondary school, like math,
physics, chemistry and biology (Beta), risk aversion (Risk), social
orientation (‘No so’ indicating whether the subject did give consistent

































answers to the social orientation questions in the questionnaire, ‘So’ as
a measure of social orientation if the subject did give consistent
answers). The fit of the data improved significantly after each analy-
sis. Only the results of the third analysis are reported. Table 5 pro-
vides the results of Wald tests on whether a set of predictors affects
behavior in the repeated PDs. Table 6 presents the estimates and tests
of single parameters in the model.
The first two lines of Table 5 show that Game type and the history of
play characteristics, Period and interactions of Game type and Period,
do affect behavior in the repeated PDs. The effects of Game type we have
already described above. From Table 6 we learn that the effect of unilat-
eral cooperation of alter increased (effect of Period on b01) over periods,
and the effect of unilateral cooperation of ego increased over periods for
the two games with the worst outcomes compared to the positive PD
(effect of MIX2xPer and NegxPer on b10). Behavior in the repeated
PDs was also affected by Game nr, that is, the number of PDs a subject
had already played. The more PDs subjects had played, the higher the
initial propensity to cooperate (b0), the more negative the effect of
mutual defection (b00) and mutual cooperation (b11), and the more posi-
tive the effect of unilateral cooperation (b10 and b01) on cooperation.
Hence, subjects started more frequently with cooperation but learned
over rounds of play that after mutual defection there was not much hope
to obtain mutual cooperation. To derive what these results imply for
unilateral and mutual cooperation, the parameter estimates must be
substituted in the expressions for unilateral and mutual cooperation
in Table 1. Tests of these expressions reveal that the effect of unilateral
and mutual cooperation did not change after playing more PDs.4
TABLE 5 Results of Wald Tests Whether a Predictor Affects Behavior in the
Repeated PDs. The Tests are Based on 25,276 Observations
Predictor Wald Df p-value
Game type 68.72 18 <0.001
Game type, Period, Game typePeriod 151.70 34 <0.001
Game nr 24.85 6 <0.001
Gender 16.29 6 0.012
Siblings 10.17 6 0.118
Beta 5.05 6 0.537
Risk 12.53 6 0.051
So 18.99 6 0.004
No so 24.85 6 <0.001
4That is, each of b00 and b11 is cancelled out by each of b10 and b01.

































TABLE 6 Estimates, Based on 25,276 Observations, and Tests of Parameter
Estimates of the Model that includes Type of PD, Subject Characteristics
(Gender, Siblings, Social Orientation (‘no so’ and ‘so’), Beta, Risk Preferences),
and History of Play Characteristics (Period, Game TypePeriod Interactions,
Game Number) as Predictors.
Robust
Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > jzj
ln(a)
MIX 1 .1435 .5257 0.27 0.785
MIX 2 .4712 .4052 1.16 0.245
NEG .5369 .3570 1.50 0.133
Game nr .0001 .0066 0.02 0.987
Gender .1429 .3118 0.46 0.647
Siblings .1947 .1082 1.80 0.072
So .1165 .0680 1.71 0.087
No so .0273 .4174 0.07 0.948
Beta .1130 .1076 1.05 0.294
Risk .0798 .1373 0.58 0.561
Cons (POS) 1.5761 .5597 2.82 0.005
b10
MIX 1 .6921 .4206 1.65 0.100
MIX 2 1.6278 .4251 3.83 0.000
NEG 2.0248 .4452 4.55 0.000
Period .2315 .1200 1.93 0.054
MIX1xPer .1267 .1414 0.90 0.370
MIX2xPer .3111 .14344 2.17 0.030
NegxPer .3904 .14153 2.76 0.006
Game nr .0114 .0035 3.27 0.001
Gender .7080 .2531 2.80 0.005
Siblings .01228 .1347 0.09 0.927
So .0987 .1259 0.78 0.433
No so .3794 .3898 0.97 0.330
Beta .0624 .0906 0.69 0.491
Risk .1275 .1225 1.04 0.298
Cons (POS) 1.9652 .7153 2.75 0.006
b01
MIX 1 .8137 .5191 1.57 0.117
MIX 2 .0385 .5110 0.08 0.940
NEG .1423 .5229 0.27 0.785
Period .28197 .1356 2.08 0.038
MIX1xPer .2028 .1690 1.20 0.230
MIX2xPer .0994 .1627 0.61 0.541
NEGxPer .0142 .1607  0.09 0.930
Game nr .0117 .0036 3.21 0.001
Gender .5201 .1918 2.71 0.007
Siblings .0749 .0794 0.94 0.346
(Continued)



































Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > jzj
So .0506 .0804 0.63 0.529
No so .0762 .2816 0.27 0.787
Beta .0906 .0686 1.32 0.187
Risk .1458 .1061 1.37 0.170
Cons (POS) 1.5423 .4880 3.16 0.002
b11
MIX 1 .4111 .8179 0.50 0.615
MIX 2 .0600 .8556 0.07 0.944
NEG .1336 .8386 0.16 0.873
Period .1216 .2378 0.51 0.609
MIX1xPer .0380 .2794 0.14 0.892
MIX2xPer .0714 .2920 0.24 0.807
NegxPer .1895 .2680 0.71 0.479
Game nr .0181 .0056 3.24 0.001
Gender 1.2088 .3667 3.30 0.001
Siblings .2984 .1795 1.66 0.096
So .1583 .1271 1.25 0.213
No so .7904 .5269 1.50 0.134
Beta .0505 .1256 0.40 0.687
Risk .1648 .1780 0.93 0.355
Cons (POS) 2.9364 1.0451 2.81 0.005
b00
MIX 1 .1065 .2594 0.41 0.682
MIX 2 .9182 .2702 3.40 0.001
NEG 1.009 .2628 3.84 0.000
Period .0157 .0651 0.24 0.809
MIX1xPer .0348 .0804 0.43 0.666
MIX2xPer .0947 .0829 1.14 0.253
NEGxPer .0913 .0735 1.24 0.214
Game nr .0101 .0025 3.96 0.000
Gender .2906 .1644 1.77 0.077
Siblings .0194 .0687 0.28 0.778
So .08277 .05918 1.40 0.162
No so .0998 .2385 0.42 0.676
Beta .0728 .0590 1.23 0.217
Risk .2776 .0804 3.45 0.001
Cons (POS) 1.2884 .3695 3.49 0.000
b0
MIX 1 .0886 .04956 1.79 0.074
MIX 2 .2062 .0696 2.96 0.003
NEG .2663 .0995 2.68 0.007
Game nr .0041 .0020 2.03 0.042
Gender .1634 .2051 0.80 0.426
(Continued)

































Further inspection of Table 5 and Table 6 reveals that there was an
effect of the subject characteristics risk aversion, gender and social
orientation on subjects’ behavior in repeated PDs. The effect of risk
aversion we have already described above. Women tend to have a lar-
ger value of b10ðp ¼ 0:005Þ and b01ðp ¼ 0:007Þ, but a smaller value of
b00ðp ¼ 0:077Þ and b11ðp ¼ 0:001Þ. However, after substituting the
parameter estimates in the expression of Table 1, tests revealed that
the effects of unilateral and mutual cooperation on cooperation in
the next round were not significantly different for men and women.4
Finally, although the overall tests of the effects of social orientation
(So and No so) were significant, only one single parameter estimate
was significantly different from zero. Subjects who did not give con-
sistent answers to the social orientation questions were more inclined
to cooperate in the first round of the PD (p ¼ 0.011). We have no mean-
ingful interpretation of this result.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our main concern in the present and in previous studies was to estab-
lish whether there are behavioral differences in negative, mixed, and
positive dilemmas, and how such differences can be explained. The
logistic learning model described here was in the first place developed
to solve the problems we encountered in previous studies to investi-
gate that concern. Game theoretic tools did not help us much in deriv-
ing predictions of behavior in periods following the first period. As a
consequence, most of the data could not be incorporated in the data
analysis because standard logistic regression analyses cannot
adequately handle the dependencies between the responses in a
repeated game. A solution to both issues was to model the data with
a learning model. Existing learning models like the Bush-Mosteller
and Roth-Erev models did not suffice for two reasons: application of
TABLE 6 Continued
Robust
Coeff. Std. Err. Z P > jzj
Siblings .0140 .1070 0.13 0.896
So .0709 .0732 0.97 0.333
No so .6886 .2712 2.54 0.011
Beta .0052 .0643 0.08 0.936
Risk .1806 .0937 1.93 0.054
Cons (POS) .9100 .3743 2.43 0.015

































them did not take characteristics of the game, of the history of play,
and of subject characteristics into account. More importantly, it is
not possible to test the effects of incorporated variables statistically.
We therefore developed a learning model in which predictors (game,
history of play, and subject characteristics) can be included to model
and test the learning parameters. The learning model is based on
logistic regression, and can be considered as a general tool for the data
analysis of any 2 2 game based on the general assumption of geo-
metric discounting. Hence, the scientific value of the logistic learning
model is wider than its application to repeated PDs in the present
study.
As an example application of the model, the data of the experiment
of van Assen and Snijders (2004, 2005) were reanalyzed with this
logistic learning model in order to (i) investigate our main research
question whether behavior is different in negative, mixed, and positive
dilemmas, and (ii) to discover if any of the subject, game, and history of
play characteristics have an effect on behavior. We indeed found that
subjects’ behavior is different in the four PD types. We observed the
following differences in behavior in the four PDs. First, there was
more cooperation in the first period in positive PDs than in the nega-
tive PDs. This result corroborates the findings of Raub and Snijders
(1997) and goes against the common intuition that it is more difficult
to establish cooperation ‘‘under negative circumstances’’ (Berejikian,
1992; Walder, 2000). Second, in the two PDs with the lowest outcomes
(D ¼ 10 and D ¼ 20) (i) the effect of previous on current behavior
was stronger, (ii) the effect of ego’s unilateral cooperation on
cooperation was smaller, and (iii) the effect of mutual defection on
cooperation was higher. Finally, some effects of risk aversion, gender,
and history of play or period were observed. These effects were prim-
arily estimated and tested to demonstrate the applicability and versa-
tility of the statistical logistic learning model. That is, we did not have
a theory concerning the effects of any of the subject characteristics on
subject behavior after period 1.
The logistic learning model is employed in the present study as an
alternative and flexible way to analyze the dependent data of repeated
2 2 games. We plan to extend this model to be able to tackle behavior
in a wider class of games with more than two choice alternatives for
all, possibly more than two, actors. A generalization of the learning
model to repeated games with more than two choice alternatives is
straightforward by combining the logic of the learning model with
multinomial logistic regression.
Interestingly, the learning model can also be used to aid
the researcher in the construction of an experiment, either as a

































manipulation variable or as a method to increase the efficiency of the
experiment. Let us start with the efficiency. As we have shown in this
experiment, the learning model allows an easy way for experimenters
to let subjects play against a ‘‘randomly chosen other person from pre-
vious experiments.’’ By fitting a learning model on previous data, one
can honestly say that a random drawing is made from the previous
subject pool. Of course, to be able to use the model as a player, one
must be guaranteed that the program provides an accurate and
realistic description of the play of the population of subjects of interest.
By first carrying out a pilot study and fitting the model to the data of
the pilot one can attempt to realize that.
The learning model can also be used as a manipulation tool in
experiments. For example, one could let subjects in different con-
ditions play against different populations of ‘‘players’’ that are repre-
sented by other values of the parameters in the logistic learning
model.
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